Simulation and modeling in crisis management by Ficek, Martin
Journal of Applied Engineering Science
doi:10.5937/jaes16-16447                                                                          Paper number: 16(2018)3, 535, 320 - 327
SIMULATION AND MODELING IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT
Martin Ficek*
Tomas Bata University in Zlín, Czech Republic                                                                                
This article deals with the possibilities of modeling and simulation in terms of crisis management. The fi rst part 
deals with simulations and modeling in the form of realized trainings of Integrated Rescue System (IRS) and crisis 
management (CM). It is focused on the most important aspects of modeling and simulation in CM conditions. In the 
following part, we are evaluating the selected SW modeling and simulation from the point of view of their possibilities 
and suitability for relation to CM. Based on expert consultation; tasks are defi ned that the SW should manage. In the 
last part, using the knowledge from the previous parts, the possible development in the area of SW modeling and 
simulation in CM is identifi ed.
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INTRODUCTION
Modern time infl uences a wide area of disciplines and 
crisis management is not the exception. One of the ar-
eas where this trend can be seen as the issue is training 
and preparation for extraordinary events (EE) and crisis 
situations (CS) - primarily the Fire Rescue Service of the 
Czech Republic (FRS) and the Integrated Rescue Sys-
tem (IRS). This is evidenced by the number of planned 
IRS trainings, when 65 were planned for the fi rst half of 
2017. Therefore, this article deals with simulations and 
modeling of leakage of dangerous substances.This ac-
tual problem is proven by the fact that 5 trainings are pri-
marily focused on this issue. With respect to the amount 
of trainings (fl oods, fi res, active shooter, and highly con-
tagious diseases, etc.) is not an insignifi cant number, 
even though, the leakage of dangerous substances (DS) 
is included in other trainings as secondary consequenc-
es.
For example in these trainings:
• February 7, 2017 –7 units of FRS and fi re protection 
units (FPO) participated in the training of EE, name-
ly DS ammunition from the new training hall, which 
was held in Třinec. [1]
• June 29, 2017 – 6 units of FRS and FPO was train-
ing the EE with the leakage of dangerous substance 
(ammonia). This training was held in the premises of 
the MP Krásno in Ostrava-Martinov. [2]
• July 31, 2017 – 7 units of FRS and FPO trained EE 
with DS (ammonia) which was leaking from multi-
functional hall Polárka in Frýdek-Místek. [3]
• March 3, 2017 – the MU with DS leakage of ammo-
nia was trained in Bučovice. [4]
Other examples of trainings will be given in the following 
chapter.
The issue of simulation and modeling of leakage of dan-
gerous substances is dealt in the following publications. 
Björnham Oscar et al.[5] discuss the risks of chemical 
leakage during transportation in a densely populated 
area and its impacts. By analysis of fl uid dynamics deals 
Sun et al. [6]. A direct comparison of two selected SWs 
is given in Ficek et al. [7]. From the point of view of sim-
ulation and modeling, Inanloo et al. [8] achieved very 
interesting results in modeling the combustion vapor 
explosion.Bernatik et al. [9] dealt with the much needed 
addition of models of computational fl uid dynamics for 
common SW such as Terex or Aloha or physical model-
ing in aerodynamic tunnels which provides data that can 
be compared with the outputs of conventional SW.
This issue is addressed also in scientifi c circles as can 
be seen in previous paragraph. Dangerous substanc-
es are used in products, processes, and procedures in 
many facilities and factories. Therefore, these substanc-
es must be stored and transported. Usually leaks occur 
at these stages. These leaks must be solved by forces 
and means of IRS.In order to better preparation for EEs 
with leakage of dangerous substances of the FRS and 
CM components, trainings, simulations and modeling 
are carried out. Therefore, the simulation and modeling 
possibilities, especially the possible developments in SW 
simulation and modeling for IRS, need to be addressed.
In this paper, selected IZS trainings focusing on leakage 
of dangerous substances will be analyzed by SWOT 
analysis. This paper will also review current SW tools for 
simulation and modeling of leakage of dangerous sub-
stances. Based on expert consultations with experts, a 
possible development will be proposed for SW simula-
tion and modeling in crisis management aimed at leak-
age of dangerous substance.
Evaluation of realized trainings:
February 7, 2017 - Training of the IRS components in the 
training hockey hall in Třinec, where 7 units of FRS and 
FPO practiced intervention in case of leakage of ammo-
nia from the cooling device. DS leaked from a pipe in the 
cooling device in the engine room. This leak was detect-
ed by a sensor at a concentration of 300 ppm (this value 
exceeds the limit for ERPGs 2). In terms of simulating 
DS spreading, it is essential that the leakage was within 
Original Scientifi c Paper
* Tomas Bata University in Zlín, nám. T. G. Masaryka 5555, 760 01 Zlín, Czech Republic, fi cek@utb.cz 320
Journal of Applied Engineering Science  Vol. 16, No. 3, 2018
ISSN 1451-4117
321
in the building. The exact amount of leakage and the size 
of the hole are unknown, but the precise substance is 
known. For the training, the approximate infi ltration sec-
tor was predetermined. When we tried to simulate the 
propagation of the substance using two different SW, 
different results were achieved. The procedure of the 
units was highly professional; however, in terms of the 
simulated leakage of dangerous substance, the distribu-
tion of the substance was not fully taken into account. To 
improve this, we recommend to simulate the propagation 
of the substance by several SW and based on the result 
determine the propagation.
6 units of FRS and FPO participated in tactical training 
on the premises of the company MP Krásno in Ostra-
va-Martinov aimed at eliminating of the consequences of 
ammonia leakage from the cooling pipeline in the engine 
room took place on June 29, 2017. This involved two 
leaks of liquid ammonia in the building. Even in this case, 
FRS and FPO units are well prepared and trained and 
the intervention itself was professional. In terms of simu-
lation, this situation is rather problematic. If a substance 
is spread in an object, it would be diffi cult to model two 
leaks that are intermingled for some time. Determining, 
for example, the resulting concentration would be prob-
lematic. During this training, the technical means, that 
prevented the propagation of the substance from the 
leakage site (engine room, compressor), should be used 
in the simulations to take into account the DS diffusion 
and interference. It would be useful to use SW with the 
possibilities of complex simulations that provide a rela-
tively good result of the threat.
In the hockey hall Polárka in Frýdek-Místek took place 
an training focused on leakage of ammonia. It took place 
on January 31, 2017 and 7 units of FRS and FPO par-
ticipated. In this tactical training, ammonia leaked from 
the cooling device (cracked valve) in the engine room. 
Leakage was detected by a sensor at a concentration 
of 50 ppm. The intervention was highly professional and 
effi cient. In terms of simulation, it is interesting that the 
defl ectors have been set up outside, so they did not dis-
guise the propagation of substance within the object.It 
may be advisable to use SW to simulate the spread of 
DS in the object and thus to work better with this data 
and to check the procedure to prevent DS from spread-
ing within the building.
At the slaughterhouse in Bučovice, on 3 March 2017, 
training was conducted in which ammonia leaked after 
a technical defect on the cooling equipment. There were 
5 units of FRS and FPO. The intervention itself was pro-
fessional and effective. In terms of simulation, the infl u-
ence of the propagation of DS in the object itself and the 
subsequent propagation outside the object was simulat-
ed. The simulation and modeling options showed how 
effective can be data obtained during training and how 
to adjust the upcoming training if we really expect the 
worst-case scenario.
The 4 trainings mentioned above, which took place in 
the fi rst half of 2017, were focused on the leakage of 
dangerous substances (ammonia). Although ammonia is 
most likely to leak in the Czech Republic, it would be ap-
propriate to train the leakage of other substances in the 
future; however, the unit progress would be essentially 
the same or the same. In terms of modeling and simula-
tion, it was found that the IRS does not use SW.The last 
example demonstrates that the usage of SW to model 
the propagation of DS in a building can contribute to the 
improvement of the training. This statement are based 
on simulations and analyzes (SWOT), but since it is only 
a training where there are no real leakage data, the au-
thor does not consider the analysis to be as signifi cant to 
be stated in the article.
CONSULTATION WITH EXPERTS AND DEFINITION 
OF THE TASKS OF THE IRS
The following information was obtained through personal 
meetings with IRS experts and Crisis Management staff. 
Interestingly, the responses were largely coincided, that 
is why there are only few suggestions and answers.
Experts have defi ned very simple and generally on:
• Transportation of resources.
• Assessing the situation at the site of intervention.
• Create an intervention base
• Preparation of resources.
• Intervention.
• Finishing of intervention and return.
In the case of a leakage of a dangerous substance, the 
tasks of the units are to reduce the immediate risks and 
limit the extent of the accident in order to stabilize the 
situation:
• exploration (if a dangerous substance accident is in-
volved),
• measures to save people and animals and closure of 
a intervention site,
• calling assistance, including units specializing in an 
accident with a dangerous substance,
• ensure a suffi cient distance from the intervention site 
to the wind direction,
• close the intervention site, identify the dangerous 
and outer zones,
• exclude sources of initiation,
• prepare resources for intervention,
• if it is possible, prevent further leakage or spreading 
of a dangerous substance,
• identifi cation of a dangerous substance, provide in-
formation about its dangers,
• if possible, take measures to capture or remove dan-
gerous substances,
• continuously evaluate the situation,
• determine the possible amount of leaked dangerous 
substance,
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• determine the size of the affected area,
• identify the status and possibilities of their change,
• identify the possibility of spreading hazardous sub-
stances, wind and weather,
• determine the terrain and settlement density,
• identify potential threats to surface or groundwater,
• determine the rate of leakage of the dangerous sub-
stance and the rate of its spreading,
• inform residents, relevant institutions and public au-
thorities,
• assess the need for population evacuation or other 
protection,
• make a prognosis of the further development of the 
accident with a view to further escalation.
When dividing the intervention site into zones with a dis-
tinctive danger, it is at least the creation of:
• dangerous zones,
• outer zones and within them
• the rear area,
• the entrance space,
• decontamination area.
As can be seen from the tasks designed for the interven-
tion with the leakage of DS, it is obvious that SW simu-
lations and modeling for DS leakage have some infl u-
ence. In the previous task list are underlined those points 
where it is possible to use this software. Bold are then 
actions that are necessary to get the basic information 
needed for the proper function of each simulation and 
modeling software.
Further, consultations with experts showed that it is 
necessary to partially improve the user interface for the 
existing SW, but especially the accuracy of the calcula-
tion of the vulnerable area. Furthermore, the proposal 
for a wider database of substances and a more detailed 
description of these substances (mainly the possibili-
ty of chemical reaction of these substances with other 
substances). Generally, they would also glad if the SW 
were created for their needs. Expert requirements will be 
discussed in more detail in the following two chapters, 
namely: Evaluation of current SW and Identifi cation of 
the possible development of SW.
Evaluation of current SW
The software must be assessed on the basis of their des-
ignation, i.e. in relation to the previous chapter, namely: 
identifi cation of dangerous and outer zones, information 
on its danger of dangerous substances, continuous as-
sessment of the situation, determination of the size of 
the affected area, assessment of the necessity of popu-
lation evacuation or other protection,the prognosis of the 
further development of the accident with respect to the 
possibility of further gradation. In addition, it is necessary 
to take into account the determination of the program 
whether it is intended for intervention units or for crisis 
and emergency planning.
These will be the parameters for SW evaluation
For SW needs: Determination of the approximate 
amount of leaked dangerous substance, the state of DS, 
the possibility of spreading dangerous substance - wind 
direction and weather development, the terrain and pop-
ulation density, the rate of leaked substance and the rate 
of its spreading.
Because the individual software often operates on sim-
ilar principles, there will be only given a summary de-
scription of only a few selected SW, two of them will then 
be selected, compared and evaluated.
Specifi cally, the software:
• Aloha
• Terex
• Effect
• Save II
• Rozex alarm
SAVE II – it is a numerical program focusing on the leak-
age of substances and their dispersion. It works on the 
principles of the Gaussian model and methodologies 
CPR 14 and CPR 18. The program allows modeling and 
simulating the following: continuous leakage followed by 
dispersion of toxic substance, leakage followed by dis-
persion of toxic substance, continuous leakage of the 
substance followed by explosion, substance leakage fol-
lowed by explosion, and turbulent leakage.
EFFECTS – the program provides an estimate of pos-
sible physical effects of leakage of toxic and fl ammable 
substances. It uses Pasquill typing and wind speed; 
models operate with open smooth terrain, so it is nec-
essary to specify the coeffi cient of surface roughness. 
The Gaussian model is used to propagate neutral gas. 
It is also possible to perform heavy gas modeling in the 
form of: instantaneous leakage, leakage of gas or dis-
persion by evaporation from the pool, dispersion result-
ing from turbulent/nozzle leakage. Gas dispersion in the 
atmosphere: Neutral gas dispersion model, heavy gas 
dispersion model, turbulent gas leakage model. Passive 
dispersion: Immediate leakage (up to 1 minute), semi-
continuous leakage (1 to 10 minutes), continuous leak-
age (longer than 10 minutes).
ROZEX Alarm – the program provides leakage model-
ing of hazardous chemicals. The program database in-
cludes 10,000 DS with additional information. It works 
with up to 19 variants of scenarios. Again, the principle 
of maximum possible damage is applied. The program 
is designed to require minimum input data. For modeling 
atmospheric dispersion, the program offers the following 
basic options:
• leakage of toxic substances - for neutral gas and 
heavy gas,
• continuous leakage of toxic substances - for neutral 
gas and heavy gas,
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• continuous leakage of toxic substances through the 
opening - for neutral gas and heavy gas.
ALOHA – Areal Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres 
operates with statistical mathematical models (SLAB 
and DEGEADIS). The software shows the maximum 
concentration of NL and its range. It provides three basic 
options: cloud leakage, instantaneous leakage and “ac-
cidental” leakage.
Advantages: large database of substances, it is possible 
to connect SW with measuring devices.
Disadvantage: works only with nonreactive substances.
It works with the following input data:
• Leakage data
• Data on the state of the atmosphere
• Data leakage source
Output data:
• The maximum leak rate - for liquids, it is the rate of 
evaporation, not the leakage rate.
• The average leak rate for at least 1 minute; for liq-
uids, it is the rate of evaporation. For pressurized 
devices, a sudden initial leakage may result in over-
estimation.
• Total leakage of substance over a maximum of 1 
hour.
• The maximum range of the hazardous zone in which 
the concentration reaches the specifi ed value.
• Maximum concentration of leaked substance at any 
given location.
• The maximum dose at the selected site, which was 
absorbed by the body within 1 hour.
TEREX – works with chemicals and explosive systems. 
The program is based on the conservative prognosis 
principle. The program needs relatively few input data: 
the amount of leakage, the wind speed, the air tempera-
ture, the type of environment, the cloudiness, and the 
time of occurrence. For each substance, additional in-
formation can be found. This software works with the fol-
lowing models: TOXI - evaluates the range and shape of 
the cloud, PLUME - this is a long-lasting leakage of gas 
into the cloud, a long-lasting leakage of boiling liquid with 
rapid evaporation into the cloud, slow evaporation of the 
liquid from the puddle to the cloud. PUFF - gas leakage 
into the cloud, rapid fl ow of boiling liquid into the cloud. 
TEROR - use of explosives. VCE, UVCE – leakage by 
explosion of a dangerous substance, such as: evalua-
tion of the impact waves caused by the detonation of the 
mixture of substance with air. POOL FIRE, JET FIRE, 
FLASH FIRE and BLEVE - escape of combustible dan-
gerous substance, these models evaluate the range of 
thermal radiation of fi res.
• Advantage: Simple setup.
• Disadvantage: insuffi cient amount of chemicals in 
database.
EVALUATION USING SWOT ANALYSIS
In order to obtain the data for the assessment, we com-
pare actual situations and their threat zones (ERPG-3) 
with the results of simulations and models in SW Ter-
ex and Aloha. Although systems operate with different 
mathematical models, they can be compared in this way, 
because the systems use input data as variables, and 
mathematical equations themselves are predefi ned.
The student’s t-test is used for statistical evaluation.
Then, the statistics are applied to data from the table 
(real and ALOHA or TEREX), from which the hypothesis 
decision H0 is determined. H0 is the hypothesis that the 
mean values are equal.
According to the procedure, we fi nd that the arithmetic 
mean of the difference between the measured reach of 
the substance and the simulated range in SW Aloha is 
-2.7989, the number of measurements is 10 and the vari-
ance s2 is 2.397465071.
Situation Substance Amount [kg] Real [km] ALOHA [km] TEREX [km]
1 chlorine 188 0.431 7.2 0.462
2 ammonia 90 0.25 2.85 0.15
3 hydrogen chloride 55 0.56 0.49 0.57
4 methyl chloride 124 0.16 0.78 0.166
5 acetaldehyde 79 0.18 1.3 0.201
6 benzene 134 0.27 0.86 0.291
7 hydrogen fl uoride 70 0.76 3.81 0.7
8 ammonia 50 0.17 2.8 0.194
9 formaldehyde 66 0.82 5.1 0.836
10 chlorine 89 1.3 7.7 1.319
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Once these values have been matched to the equation
The result is t = 5.71625.
Tabulated critical value t1- α / 2(v), where v = n - 1 and 
α is chosen to 0.05, is 0.05, the conclusion therefore is 
that: t > t1 - α / 2(v). So there is a statistically signifi cant 
difference. 
We reject the zero hypotheses H0, i.e. the mean value of 
the measured values differs from the mean value of the 
simulated values using SW Aloha.
Applying the same procedure for SW Terex results in:
Calculated value t = 0.021353
The tabulated critical value t1 - α / 2(v), where v = n - 1 
and α is 0.05, is equal to 3.25.
Thus: t < t1 - α / 2(v).
So there is a statistically insignifi cant difference. We ac-
cept the zero hypotheses H0, i.e. the mean value of the 
real values is not signifi cantly different from the mean 
value of the simulated values using SW Terex.
Table 1: SWOT analysis Aloha
SWOT - Aloha Auxiliary Noxious
Inner origin Strengths:
The system provides signifi cant simulation capabilities.
Possibility to extend DS through an external database.
Possibility of connection with external measuring stations.
Weaknesses:
The results can be distorted.
External origin Opportunities:
Work with 3D terrain models.
Terrain optimization.
Improvement of numerical models.
Threats:
As a result of oversize results, re-
sults will not be taken into account.
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The quantifi cation of this SWOT analysis is as follows:
Strengths Rating Weight Result
The system provides signifi cant simulation capabilities 5 0.4 2
Possibility to extend DS through an external database 4 0.2 0.8
Possibility of connection with external measuring stations 5 0.4 2
Total 4.8
Weaknesses Rating Weight Result
The results can be distorted -4.5 1 -4.5
Total -4.5
Opportunities Rating Weight Result
Work with 3D terrain models 4.5 0.3 1.35
Terrain optimization 4 0.2 0.8
Improvement of numerical models 5 0.5 2.5
Total 4.15
Threats Rating Weight Result
As a result of oversize results, results will not be taken into 
account -4 1 -4
Total -4
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Internal Value = Strengths + Weaknesses = 4.8 - 4.5 = 0.3
External Value = Opportunities + Threats = 4.15 - 4 = 0.15
Result value = Internal value + External value = 0.3 + 
0.15 = 0.45
SW Aloha has a relatively low result, due to overrated 
results, which are not suitable for use in CR. It is true that 
the principle of protection of the population is: “expect 
the worst, at least you will be prepared”, but SW Aloha 
is overrating the results so much that any intervention, 
according to the results, would be much more expen-
sive and would lack in effi ciency. However, SW Aloha is 
well-suited for crisis planning as it allows complex sim-
ulations to provide important information. Therefore, it 
should not be neglected.
The following section will focus on possible develop-
ments in the fi eld of SW simulation and modeling of leak-
age of dangerous substances.
IDENTIFICATION OF POSSIBLE SW DEVELOPMENT
Generally, it is necessary to deal with the possible devel-
opments in SW simulation and modeling. This is about 
refi ning models for calculating threat zones.This trend 
is valid for all SWs. Other trends are for certain groups 
of these SW. These trends include: involvement of 3D 
terrain models and air layers, simplifying the interface 
for enrolling and creating simulations, optimizing SW for 
fi eld use, and for another group of optimizations, in order 
to create more complex simulations, and it would be ap-
propriate for all SWs to be connected with other devices 
such as measuring and monitoring stations.
Expert consultations have led to the desire for SW to 
work primarily on devices (workstations, smartphones.
etc), but would also communicate on a client-server ba-
sis, ensuring constant up-to-date information thusensur-
ing functionality during server malfunction.Also, the abil-
ity to share results with other users could contribute to 
more effective interventions.
It is understandable that each SW will have specifi c 
properties and therefore specifi c possibilities for further 
development, but the goal is to identify possible develop-
ments in simulation and modeling software for leakage of 
dangerous substance.
CONCLUSION
Leakage of dangerous substances is an extraordinary 
situation that is threatening almost every day. This is 
mainly due to the dependence of today's society on 
these substances. It is always necessary to transport 
and use DS in a variety of facilities and technological 
processes. Therefore, there is a need to plan for the sit-
uations of DS leakage. To plan for such situations, you 
need to know the threat zones. This is useful for SW, that 
models and simulates the leakage of DS and calculate 
the threat zone. From time to time there is a leak of DS, 
in this case the use of simulation and modeling software 
to determine the threat zone.
Two SW were selected in the article, namely SW Aloha 
and SW Terex. Real situations were entered into these 
SWs and the results were compared with real measured 
data. The evaluation was carried out on two levels, in 
the form of a statistical part. In this section it was found 
that SW Aloha has statistically signifi cant differences in 
the threat zones compared to the real situation. SW Ter-
ex has statistically insignifi cant differences in the same 
comparison.
The second comparison was done through SWOT anal-
ysis. It is focused on the entire SW. For each SW, the 
results differed, and generally the selected SW can be 
evaluated as relatively effective, but each has its primary 
purpose. SW Aloha is better to use in crisis planning, 
where there is plenty of time and allows more complex 
simulations. While SW Terex is more likely to be used 
during interventions, due to its relative accuracy and sim-
plicity.
In the near future, possible developments should be in 
3D modeling of terrain and air layers. Furthermore, cre-
ating an interface,that would simplify the creation of sim-
ulation during intervention, and at the same time enable 
comprehensive and complex simulation to be used for 
crisis planning.And fi nally, the possibility of connecting 
SWs and sensors or actors will be developed. The SW 
function is based on the hybrid principle client-server and 
SW on workstations.
It may seem that this area has already been explored, 
but the refi nement of the models and the results of the 
simulations combined with the connection with sensors 
and actor models can make a signifi cant contribution to 
a safer future.
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